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PRETRIAL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS: OPTIONS
AND CONSTRAINTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
DOUGLASS CASSEL*
This article analyzes the grounds,procedures and conditions required
by InternationalHuman Rights Law and InternationalHumanitarian Law
for pretrial detention of suspected terroristsfor purposes of criminal law
enforcement, andfor theirpreventive detentionfor security and intelligence
purposes. Recognizing the difficulties in securing sufficient admissible
evidence to prosecute terrorists within the tight time limits imposed by
internationallaw, the Article nonetheless suggests that indefinite detention,
solely or primarily for purposes of intelligence interrogation, is probably
not lawful under U.S. or international law. Preventive detention for
security purposes, on the other hand, is generally permitted by
international law, provided that it is based on grounds and procedures
previously established by law; is not arbitrary, discriminatory or
disproportionate; is publicly registered and subject to fair and effective
judicial review, and that the detainee is not mistreated and is compensated
for any unlawful detention. In Europe, however, even with these
safeguards, preventive detention for security purposes is generally not
permitted, unless a State in time of national emergency formally derogates
from its obligation to respect the right to liberty under the European
Convention on Human Rights. The Article concludes that if preventive
detention of suspected terroristsfor security purposes is to be allowed at
all, its inherent danger to liberty must be appreciated, its use kept to an
absolute minimum, and the European model should be followed, that is,
such detention should be permitted only by formal derogation in time of
national emergency, and then only to the extent and for the time strictly
required.

Professor of Law; Director, Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law
School.
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I. DETAINING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS: SCENARIOS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

On what grounds, by what procedures, and within what limits under
international law, may the United States lawfully detain suspected terrorists
in order to interrogate or prosecute them, or to prevent them from planning
future attacks? The actual detention practices of the United States in
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) are now
largely matters of public record. Suspected terrorists have been detained in
the United States for purposes of deportation and criminal justice (whether
as suspects or as material witnesses). They have been captured overseas on
the battlefield, in occupied territory or elsewhere, and then detained by the
military or CIA for purposes of interrogation and preventive security. A
minority have eventually been held for military trial. Detentions of
suspected terrorists have taken many forms, including the following
examples.
Prosecutions. Caught on a flight to the United States with a lit match
in his explosive-laden sneaker, so-called "shoe bomber" Richard Reid pled
guilty and was sentenced to prison.1 Al Qaeda collaborator Zacarias
Moussaoui pled guilty to conspiracy to commit terrorist offenses and was
sentenced to life in prison.2 However, most successful federal prosecutions
since 9/11 have targeted not terrorists, but persons who provide material
support to terrorist groups.3 These prosecutions have been relatively
successful, despite recurrent problems of prosecutorial misconduct 4 and
difficulties in reconciling the rights of the accused with the government's
need to maintain confidential information.5
Material Witnesses. Where additional time was needed to investigate
a suspect, prosecutors appear to have held
some suspects temporarily as
6
material witnesses in other criminal cases.
Deportation. More than a thousand foreign citizens were detained in
the United States in connection with the 9/11 investigation, including nearly

1 See United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2004).

2 United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 223 n.1 (4th Cir. 2007).
3 See Adam Liptak, Impressions of Terrorism, Drawnfrom CourtFiles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2008, at A15.
4 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Ex-Prosecutor 'Crossed Over the Line,' Jury is Told, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A 16.
5 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
931 (2005).
6 See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d
42 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005).
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800 for civil immigration violations. 7 Even after immigration judges
ordered some of them8 deported, some were kept in continued detention
pending FBI clearance.
Battlefield. The military detained suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters at Bagram Air Base and elsewhere in Afghanistan. 9
Occupied Territory. The military detained suspected terrorists and
other suspected security risks (along with common criminals) at Abu
Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq. °
Military Detention for Prosecution. The military detained at least
two dozen, and perhaps as many as 80 prisoners, at the United States Naval
Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for prosecution before military
commissions."1 As of this writing, military commissions have tried only
two prisoners, one of whom pled
guilty and the other of whom was
12
charge.
lesser
a
of
only
convicted
Military Detention of Foreign Citizens for Security and
Interroation. The military detained hundreds of other suspected foreign
terrorists at Guantanamo, 13 most captured in the Afghan war or neighboring
Pakistan, but some picked up in countries far from any recognized
battlefield. 14 These prisoners were held without charges and without access
to lawyers or courts until the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus brought on their
behalf. 15 Many were then afforded access to counsel1 6 and to formal

7 ELEANOR ACER, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES

x-xi, 34 (2003).

8 See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano, Rights Ensnarledin Dragnet: Immigration Statutes Used

to Hold Suspects Indefinitely and Detain Material Witnesses,

SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 27,

2001, at A6.
9 See generally JOHN SIFTON, ASIA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "ENDURING
FREEDOM:" ABUSES BY U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), in 16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 3

(2004).
10 See, e.g., Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, The Reach of War: Abu Ghraib; Scant
Evidence Cited in Long Detention of Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at Al.
II By mid-July 2008 only twenty or so Guantanamo prisoners had been referred for trial
by military commission. W. Glaberson & E. Lichtblau, Guantanamo Detainee's Trial
Opens, Ending a Seven-Year Legal Tangle, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at A12.
12 Id.; W. Glaberson, PanelSentences Bin Laden Driver to Short Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2008, at Al.
13 Glaberson & Lichtblau, supra note 11.
14 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479-80 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting

from denial of cert.) (noting that petitioner prisoners are "natives of Algeria, and citizens of
Bosnia, seized in Bosnia" and other detainees are citizens of other "friendly nations," and
"many were seized outside of any theater of hostility"), reh "g and cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3078 (2007); rev'd and remanded, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
15 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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administrative review by Combatant Status Review Tribunals composed of
military officers. 7 In 2005 and 2006, however, Congress purported to deny
them habeas corpus, offering instead an alternative statutory mechanism for
limited judicial review. 8 In 2008 the Supreme Court ruled that foreign
citizens detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo are constitutionally
guaranteed the privilege of habeas corpus, and that the alternative statutory
review was not an adequate substitute.1 9 The Court then vacated and
remanded a separate case, involving the adequacy of the administrative
review, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.20 As of mid-July 2008 some 265 prisoners were still detained at
Guantanamo. 2 1
Military Detention of U.S. Citizens. The military also attempted to
detain at least two U.S. citizens indefinitely on security grounds, without
criminal charges and without access to lawyers, at military brigs in the
United States.22 That practice ended after the Supreme Court held in 2004
that due process of law requires, at minimum, that detained Americans be
informed of the grounds for their detention and have an opportunity to rebut
the grounds before an impartial decision maker,23 possibly with assistance
of counsel.24

16

See Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 188-90 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh 'g denied, 503 F.3d

137 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted
andjudgment vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008).
17 Memorandum from the Deputy Sec'y of Defense to the Sec'y of the Navy, Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
18See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. Law 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739
(2005); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
19 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240, 2274 (2008). The Court noted that under
Article 1, Section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution, the writ may be suspended when required
by the public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion. Id. at 2240. See also AI-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (allowing indefinite detention in the U.S.
as an enemy combatant of a Qatari citizen suspected of terrorism, provided the government
can prove its allegations in further habeas proceedings), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 19,
2008.
20 Gates v. Bismullah, 128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008) (mem.).
21 Glaberson & Lichtblau, supra note 11.
22 See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-63 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial
of cert.); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004).
23 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
24 Id. at 539.
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Secret CIA Detention Overseas. The CIA detained, and continues to
detain, suspected Al Qaeda leaders and top operatives incommunicado in
secret detention centers overseas. 5
Except for detentions pending deportation, the purposes of these post9/11 detentions fall into two broad categories: criminal law enforcement
and preventive detention for security and intelligence purposes. This article
analyzes the permissible grounds, procedures and conditions of both
categories of detention under International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and
(in cases of armed conflict) under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).26
Where IHRL allows States to "derogate" from, that is, to suspend, the fight
to personal liberty, in war or other national emergency,27 the limits on
detentions under derogation are analyzed as well.
The focus of this article is on detention. Related issues, such as the
rights of suspected terrorists in criminal trials, 28 or their right not to be sent
to countries where they would likely be tortured, 29 are not addressed.
There are four main international law settings in which suspected
terrorists may be detained. They are: (1) peacetime, (2) public emergencies
short of war, in which States derogate from the right to liberty, (3) armed
conflicts of an international character, and (4) armed conflicts of a noninternational character. IHRL governs the first two settings: peacetime and
public emergencies short of war. IHRL and IHL, read together and in
harmony, govern the other two situations: armed conflict, both international
and non-international. Thus, there are basic substantive and procedural

25 Amnesty International,

USA: Off the Record: U.S. Responsibility for Enforced

Disappearancesin the "War on Terror," Al Index No. AMR 51/093/2007, June 6, 2007; M.
Mazzetti, Officials Say C.I.A. Kept Qaeda Suspect in Secret Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,

2008, at A6.
26 Battlefield detentions and detentions of prisoners of war (POWs) are excluded from
this analysis. Immediate detention of captured combatants on or near the battlefield involves
military exigencies requiring separate legal analysis. Detained prisoners of war are protected
by special provisions of the Geneva Conventions. See generally Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.

135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva III]. However, detention of
enemy combatants who are suspected terrorists, and who do not qualify for the special
treatment accorded prisoners of war by IHL, is not excluded from the analysis here.
27 See infra Part 11.

28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
29 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3.1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100.20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT].
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international law norms that govern detentions of suspected terrorists in all
situations. 30
Part II below identifies the sources and applicability of relevant IHRL
and IHL.
Part III summarizes the "consensus" of IHRL and IHL
instruments governing detentions of suspected terrorists in all four settings.
Part IV addresses detentions for purposes of criminal prosecution. Part V
considers preventive detention for security purposes. Part VI discusses
minimum requirements for treatment of all detainees and the right of
compensation for all persons unlawfully detained. A concluding section
reviews the options for detaining suspected terrorists, and asks whether
preventive detention for security purposes, outside the context of armed
conflict, should be permitted at all.
I. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW

This article derives the elements of the IHRL consensus on norms
governing detention of suspected terrorists from the following instruments.
*
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),31
joined by 162 State Parties including the U.S., 32
* Universal Declaration of Human Rights 33 (UDHR) (largely
evidence of customary international law),34

30

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently adopted the

principles and safeguards proposed by an ICRC Legal Adviser, which take a similar view.
Jelena Pejic, ProceduralPrinciples and Safeguardsfor Internment/Administrative Detention
in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 375, 380

(2005). Throughout this Article the common principles and safeguards thus identified by the
ICRC are noted. The ICRC's new institutional guidelines, originally published as Pejic's
Article, "set out a series of broad principles and specific safeguards that the ICRC believes
should, at a minimum, govern any form of detention without criminal charges." Procedural
Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and
Other Situations of Violence, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 30IC/07/8.4 at 11, available at http://www.icrc.org/web
/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/30-international-conference-working-documents- 121007/$File
/301C_8-4 IHLchallenges_.Report&Annexes ENGFINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
ICRC
Guidelines] (document prepared by the ICRC for the 30th International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent).
31 ICCPR, supra note 28.
32See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ICCPR,
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/ratification/4.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
34 See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic
Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 394 (1985).
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*
United Nations Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment 3or
Punishment (CAT),35 joined by 145 State
6
Parties including the U.S.,

*
United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of all
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 37 (BP)
(arguably evidence of customary international law),38
*
Regional instruments:
* European Convention40 on Human Rights (ECHR),39
joined by 47 State Parties,
* American Convention42 on Human Rights (ACHR), 4'
joined by 24 State Parties,
* American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (ADHR),43 an authoritative interpretation of the
human rights commitments in the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS),44 a treaty to
which the U.S. is a party; the Declaration is used by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as the
yardstick to monitor American States that are not parties
to the ACHR,4 5

35 CAT, supra note 29.
36

See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, CAT,

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
3' G.A. Res. 43/173, 76th plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/43/174 (Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter
BP].
38 Many provisions of the BP appear as well in numerous IHRL instruments, including
those reviewed in this Article.
39 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter ECHR].
40 See Council of Europe, Ratification Table, http://www.coe.int/T/e/comaboutcoe
/member states/default.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
41 American Convention on Human Rights Organization of American States Treaty, Nov.
22, 1969, B-32, O.A.S.T.S. 36 [hereinafter ACHR].
42 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights "Pact
of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-32.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2008) (ratification
table).
43 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, Int'l
Conference of Am. States, 9th Conference, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. XX (May 2, 1948)
[hereinafter ADHR].
44 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10, 43 (July 14, 1989).
45 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. l(2)(b), O.A.S. Res.
447 (IX-0/79), 9th Sess., O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.PIIX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88 (1979).
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0 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (BP
Americas), adopted by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in 2008,46
* African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(ACHPR),4 7 joined by 53 State Parties.48
In international armed conflict, this IHRL consensus is complemented
by two IHL treaties: the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on Protection
50
49
of Civilians (Geneva IV), joined by 194 State Parties including the U.S.,
and Additional Geneva Protocol I of 1977 (Geneva Protocol 1), 51 with 167
State Parties. 52 During non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3)53 and Additional
55
Geneva Protocol II of 1977 (Geneva Protocol I),

54

with 163 State Parties,

govern in addition to IHRL.
IHRL and IHL apply in differing ways in the four international law
settings. During peacetime IHRL applies to State Parties that have joined
IHRL treaties, and to other States to the extent IHRL norms are recognized
as customary international law. Despite unpersuasive objections by the
United States 56 and Israel, 57 IHRL governs detentions of suspected terrorists

46 Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the

Americas, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. 1/08 (Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter BP Americas].
47 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter ACHPR].
48 See African
Union, ACHPR, http://www.affica-union.org/root/AU/Documents
/Treaties/List/African%20Charter/o20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%20Rightspdf (last
visited Aug. 8, 2008) (ratification table).
49 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
50 This information is correct as of February 20, 2008. See Ratification Table at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party.maintreaties/
(last visited Aug. 8, 2008)
[hereinafter Ratification Table].
51 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144 Annex I, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
52 See Ratification Table, supra note 50.
53 Common Article 3 is the identical Article 3 in each of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 3.
54 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144 Annex II, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol II].
55 See Ratification Table, supra note 50.
56 Rasul v. Bush, Brief for the Respondents, 2003 U.S. Briefs 334, at 38-39. The
Government has taken the position that foreign citizen prisoners held outside the United
States have no "substantive rights." See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.
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outside a State's territory, so long as the detainees are within the effective
custody and control of the State. 8
During public emergencies short of armed conflict, IHRL treaties
continue to apply, subject to any derogation from the right to liberty
lawfully made by State Parties. 59
During armed conflict, not only IHL, but also IHRL, applies.
Contentions to the contrary by the United States 60 and Israel 61 are not
persuasive. For example, two IHRL treaties, the ECHR and ACHR, both
expressly permit derogations from certain human rights in time of war. 62 If
they did not apply in war at all, no such treaty provisions would be
necessary. In addition, the Convention Against Torture, to which
the U.S.
63
is a party, expressly prohibits torture even in a "state of war.,
After canvassing the authorities, the International Court of Justice
explained the relation of IHRL and IHL in international armed conflict as
follows: some rights are exclusively matters of IHL, some are exclusively
matters of IHRL, and some are matters of both IHL and IHRL. Where both
Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.C. 2005), vacated on other grounds sub nom Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
57 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Advisory Op., 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 110 (July 9) [hereinafter PalestinianWall].
58 Id. f 111 (explaining that ICCPR is "applicable in respect of acts done by a State in
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory"); U.N. Human Rights Committee,
General Comment no. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties
to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter
HRC GC 31].
Extraterritorial application of the ECHR does not extend, however, to extraterritorial
detentions carried out by State forces acting for the United Nations under a Chapter VII
Security Council mandate, See Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41
(2007) (Grand Chamber),
144-52. In contrast, the ICCPR does apply to those "within the
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory,... such
as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation." Id. 10.
See also R. (on the application of Al-Skeini et al.) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, (2007)
U.K.H.L. 26, TT 6, 33, 84, 92, 99 & 151 (stating there is no jurisdiction under ECHR over
killings of Iraqis shot by British patrols in Iraq, but jurisdiction over killing of Iraqi prisoner
in British military detention).
59 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1; ECHR, supra note 39, art. 15.1; ACHR, supra note 41,
art. 27.1.
60 Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees
in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 41 I.L.M. 1015, 1019 (2002) ("It is humanitarian law, and not
human rights law, that governs the capture and detention of enemy combatants in armed
conflict.").
61 PalestinianWall, Advisory Op., 2004 I.C.J. 136, 102.
62 ECHR, supra note 39, art. 15.1; ACHR, supra note 41, art. 27.1.
63 CAT, supra note 29, art. 2.2 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war ...may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
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apply, IHL supplies the lex specialis, 64 that is, the specific norm that
prevails in the face of a more general IHRL norm.65
However, the fact that IHL is lex specialis does not mean that it always
prevails over IHRL. IHL not only sets its own standards for detention, but
also expressly adopts IHRL norms, where those set higher bars. The
"minirum ' '66 IHL requirements for detention are set forth in Article 75 of
Geneva Protocol I, a treaty ratified by the overwhelming majority of
States.67 Article 75 also represents customary international law, binding
even those States, including the U.S., which are not parties to Geneva
Protocol 1.68 It appears in a section of Geneva Protocol I whose rules are
"additional" to "other applicable rules of international law relating to the
protection of fundamental human rights during international armed
conflict, 6 9 meaning IHRL.7 ° Moreover, it provides that it does not limit
"any other more favourable provision granting greater protection, under any
applicable rules of international law ....
Thus, whenever IHRL grants greater protection than IHL to persons
detained in international armed conflict, IHL mandates that the detainees
benefit from any more favorable provisions of IHRL.
In non-international armed conflict, Geneva Protocol II recognizes that
persons may be deprived of liberty for reasons related to the armed
conflict, 72 and mandates that they be treated humanely, 73 but does not
specify the grounds or procedures for detention. In the resulting absence of
IHL lex specialis, IHRL norms govern the grounds, substantive limits and
procedures for detention in non-international armed conflict.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Preamble to Geneva Protocol II,
which recalls that "international instruments relating to human rights offer a
basic protection to the human person., 74 The authoritative Commentary by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that such

64 Palestinian Wall, Advisory
65

Op., 2004 I.C.J. 136,

106.

Lex specialis is short for lex specialis derogategenerali, or, roughly translated from

the Latin, "the special rule overrides the general rule." Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of
InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 132 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
66 Geneva Protocol I, supranote 51, art. 75.1.
67 Geneva Protocol I has 167 State Parties. Ratification Table, supra note 50.
68 Brief for Louise Doswald-Beck et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6-7 &
nn.15-16, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184).
69 Geneva

Protocol I, supranote 51, art. 72.

70 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 378.
71 Geneva

Protocol 1,supranote 51, art. 75.8.
Geneva Protocol II, supra note 54, art. 2.
71 Id. arts. 4-6.
74 Id. second preambular paragraph.
72
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human rights instruments include the ICCPR, the Convention Against
Torture, and regional human rights treaties. 75
In war or other emergency threatening the life of a nation, some IHRL
rights-such as the rights not to be tortured or enslaved-cannot be
suspended.7 6 However, States may derogate from certain rights,77 subject to
the following limitations.
*
Only certain rights are subject to derogation. These include the
right to liberty of person, 78 but not the right of the detainee to seek
prompt judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention.7 9
*
The nature, geographical scope and duration of the derogation
must be no more than "strictly required" to meet the exigencies of the
situation.80
*
The derogation must be non-discriminatory. 81 For example, it
82
may not impermissibly discriminate against foreign citizens.
*
The derogation must not violate other norms of international
law,8 3 such as IHL, which continues to apply even if a State derogates
from an IHRL treaty guarantee of the right to personal liberty.
*
The derogating State must file a document with the treaty
depository informing other State Parties
of the articles from which it
84
why.
reasons
the
and
derogated
has

75 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
CONVENTIONS OF

1949 [hereinafter ICRC

4428-30 (Yves Sandoz et. al. eds., 1987).

COMMENTARY],

8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
Commentary on Protocol II,

76E.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.2 (providing that no derogation is allowed from
provisions providing for right to life; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery, slave trade, and servitude; freedom from
imprisonment for debt; freedom from retroactive criminal laws; right to legal personality;
and freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief).
17 Id. art. 4.1 ("In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation");
ECHR, supra note 39, art. 15.1 ("[I]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation"); ACHR, supra note 41, art. 27.1 ("In time of war, public danger, or other
emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party").
78E.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.2.
79 See infra note 130.
80 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4),
T 4, CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add.i 1 (2001) [hereinafter HRC GC 29].
81 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1 (allowing derogation, provided, among other
conditions, that the measures taken "do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin").
82 A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2004] UKHL 56, 67.
83 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1 (allowing States to derogate from ICCPR
rights, provided, among other conditions, that the measures taken "are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law").
84 See, e.g., id. art. 4.3.
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Because of these restrictions on derogation, as discussed below,
derogating from the right to personal liberty does not give a State carte
blanche to detain suspected terrorists.
III. CONSENSUS OF IHRL AND IHL NORMS ON DETENTION
A consensus of norms in IHRL instruments, supplemented by IHL
norms during armed conflict, provides a minimum core of protections for
persons detained as suspected terrorists, in each of the four international law
settings. 85 These core protections are as follows.
Grounds. 86 Under IHRL the detention must not be arbitrary, and must
be based on grounds previously established by law. Under IHL, detentions
of foreign citizen non-combatants are permitted only where "absolutely
necessary"88 to security, 87 or where "necessary, for imperative reasons of
security.,
Substantive Restrictions.8 9 The detention must be proportional, that
is, no more restrictive or prolonged than strictly required by the exigencies
of the security situation. It must also be non-discriminatory, including as
between citizens and foreigners.
Procedures. 90 The detention must be based on procedures previously
established by law and:
* Must be registered,
Must not be incommunicado for more than a few days,
*
*
Must inform the detainee of the reasons for detention and, if she
is foreign, of her right to communicate with her consulate for
assistance,
* Must be subject to prompt and effective judicial control, at least
on the initiative of the detainee, and
Must afford the detainee a fair judicial hearing on the lawfulness
*
of the detention.

85 Most elements of this consensus may also represent customary international law,

binding even when the instruments themselves are not binding or where binding treaties
have not been ratified by some States. However, one would have to analyze the extent of
State practice and opinio juris to determine whether all elements of the consensus amount to
customary law. See generally Thirlway, supra note 65, at 121-27 (explaining formation of
customary international law).
86 See infra Part V.b-c.

87Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 42.
8 Id. art. 78.
89 See infra Part V.b-c.
90 See infra Part VI.
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Treatment of Detainee. 91 The conditions of detention must be
humane, and the detainee must be provided with access to regular medical
evaluation and treatment.
Compensation.92 The detainee must have a right to be compensated
for unlawful detention.
Other International Law. Under IHRL the detention must comply
with all other applicable requirements of international law, including IHL in
armed conflict. 93 Likewise, under IHL the detention must respect any
"more favourable" provisions of IHRL.94
Additional safeguards protect persons detained for purposes of
criminal prosecution. They must be promptly informed of the criminal
charge, 95 their detention must be no more restrictive or prolonged than
justified by such "essential reasons" as the risks of flight, repetition of the
offense, or interference with justice,96 and they must in any event be
brought to trial with reasonable expedition.9 7
In Europe, additional restrictions are imposed on preventive detentions
for security purposes. Such detentions are permitted in Europe, if at all,
only by temporary and limited derogation from the right to liberty.9 8
The following Parts elaborate on the legal and policy implications of
the consensus of IHRL and IHL norms in the contexts of detention for
criminal law enforcement (Part IV) and preventive detention for security
purposes (Part V).
IV. DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
A. UNDER IHRL
Prosecution of suspected terrorists, as opposed to prosecutions of those
who provide "material support" to terrorist groups, 99 can be exceedingly
difficult for a number of reasons. The grounds for suspicion may be based
on inadmissible intelligence information.
For instance, intelligence

9' See infra Part VII.
92 See infra Part VII.
93 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1 (in derogation).

94 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
95 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.2.
96 MANFRED

NOWAK,

U.N.

COVENANT

COMMENTARY 233 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
97 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.3.
98 See infra Part V.e.
99 Liptak, supra note 3.
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agencies may be reluctant to allow prosecutors to reveal the nature and
targeting of electronic and other means of surveillance, or the identities of
human intelligence agents, or the fact that these agents have infiltrated or
otherwise have access to information about terrorist groups. Information
received from foreign intelligence agencies may have been procured by
torture, rendering it inadmissible in court. 1°° Secretive terrorist operatives
may leave little evidentiary trail, perhaps enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion but not enough to show probable cause, let alone guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Interrogation may be frustrated because terrorists are
trained to resist standard interrogation techniques. Witnesses may fear to
testify. Proving international terrorism may require witnesses from
overseas, who may be unwilling or unable to come to court.
Prosecutions do sometimes succeed. Shoe bomber Richard Reid,
Zacarias Moussaoui, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombers were all
convicted and sentenced to prison.' 0 So, too, was Jose Padilla, although
the wide conspiracy net used to convict him, on very little evidence, is
troubling.' °2 German courts eventually found a way to convict Mounir El
Motassadeq, after initially acquitting him, because the U.S. refused at first
to provide statements from Al Qaeda prisoners in secret CIA prisons, before
finally agreeing to provide summaries of the interrogations. 0 3 Still, the
difficulties remain daunting.
When prosecutions are attempted, pretrial detention must comply with
the consensus of IHRL and IHL norms summarized in Part III above. Most
10 5
04
countries easily meet the requirement that the grounds and procedures
1ooSee A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. (No 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC

221.
101See United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 220 n.1 (4th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 78, 80 (2d Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003).
102 E.g., John Farmer, Op-Ed., A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008,
4-14.
103 Associated Press, 9/11 Suspect's Acquittal Is Overturned, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2006,
at 14; John Crewdson, Only 9/11 Conviction Tossed Out in Germany; Judges Cite Lack of
Cooperation by U.S. Government; CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2004, at 1;U.S. Offers Evidence for
Sept. 11 Retrial,CHI.TUB., May 14, 2005, at 6.
104 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1; ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.2 ("No one shall be
deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons . . . established beforehand by the
constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.");
ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 6 ("No one may be deprived of his freedom except for
reasons.., previously laid down by law."); ADHR, supra note 43, art. XXV ("No person
may be deprived of his liberty except in the cases ... established by pre-existing law.").
Pejic asserts the general principle that "[i]ntemment/administrative detention must
conform to the principle of legality." Pejic, supra note 30, at 383. In this context, the
principle of legality "means that a person may be deprived of liberty only for reasons

2008]

PRETRIAL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION

for pretrial detention be previously established by law. Prosecutions in US
federal court plainly meet these requirements. 0 6 Detention for trial by
military commission, however, may not.1°
IHRL also prohibits "arbitrary" pretrial detention. 10 8 This prohibition
incorporates the principle of proportionality. Detention is not permitted
except to the extent necessary to achieve a purpose relevant to the criminal
prosecution, such as avoiding flight, repeating the offense or interference
with witnesses.10 9 The ICCPR states that pretrial detention must not be the
"general rule." 10 The Human Rights Committee elaborates that pretrial

(substantive aspect) and in accordance with procedures (procedural aspect) that are provided
for by domestic and international law." Id.
105 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1 ("No one shall be deprived of his liberty except.., in
accordance with such procedures as are established by law."); ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.2
("No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except... under the conditions established
beforehand by the constitution ...or by a law .... ); ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 6 ("No
one may be deprived of his freedom except for ... conditions previously laid down by
law."); ADHR, supra note 43, art. XXV ("No person may be deprived of his liberty
except.., according to the procedures established by pre-existing law."); BP, supra note 37,
princ. 2 ("[D]etention... shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose."); BP
Americas, supra note 46, princ. IV. The ICRC treats this procedural requirement as the
procedural aspect of the more generally applicable "principle of legality." ICRC Guidelines,
supra note 30, at 383.
Although, as noted in the preceding text, the ECHR does not allow security detention
except, perhaps, by derogation. ECHR Article 5.1 states generally, "No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save ... in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law." ECHR,
supra note 39. In view of the emphasis in Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, no. 3)
15,
37 (1961), on the procedural "safeguards" for the Irish security detention under
derogation from Article 5, one might expect the European Court, if it were to allow a
security detention under derogation today, to require that it be done pursuant to a procedure
prescribed by law.
106 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (2008) (granting federal judges and magistrates the power to
order pretrial detention).
107 E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding that military commission's
structures and procedures violated Uniform Code of Military Justice).
108 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1; UDHR, supra note 33, art. 9; ACHR, supra note 41,
art. 7.3; ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 6; BP Americas, supranote 46, princ. 111.1. The ADHR
Article XXV is entitled "Right of Protection from Arbitrary Arrest." ADHR, supra note 43,
art. XXV. Although protection against arbitrary detention is not explicit in ECHR Article 5,
it is doubtless implicit. E.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 76 ("Judicial
control of interferences by the executive with the individual's right to liberty is an essential
feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5 § 3, which is intended to minimise the risk of
arbitrariness and to ensure the rule of law.").
109 NOWAK, supra note 96, at 233; BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 111.2.
110 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.3; BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 111.2.
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detention must be the exception, not the rule." 1 Even so, when there is
enough evidence to initiate criminal proceedings against terrorists,
prosecutors should be able to justify pretrial detention. Most courts readily
accept that alleged terrorists, especially international terrorists, pose a flight
or danger risk.
A more problematic norm for prosecuting terrorists is the requirement
that pretrial detainees be brought "without delay" before a judge to
determine the lawfulness of their detention, and to order release if the
detention is not lawful.' 12 The Human Rights Committee interprets
"without delay" in this context to mean not more than a "few days. 1 13
This leaves prosecutors scant time after arrest to assemble sufficient
admissible evidence to persuade a judge to order pretrial detention.
Because of this time squeeze, British legislation in the 1980s allowed
suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland to be detained for up to seven days
before being brought before a judge. This practice was challenged before
the European Court of Human Rights, for failure to bring suspects
"promptly" before a judge. In defending the seven-day maximum period of
police detention, the British government argued that:
[I]n view of the nature and extent of the terrorist threat and the resulting problems
in obtaining evidence sufficient to bring charges, the maximum statutory period of
detention of seven days was ... indispensable ....[T]hey drew attention to the
difficulty faced by the security forces in obtaining evidence which is both admissible
and usable in consequence of training in anti-interrogation techniques adopted by
those involved in terrorism. Time was also needed to undertake necessary scientific
examinations, to correlate information from other detainees and to liaise with other
security forces....
[T]he Government pointed out the difficulty, in view of the acute sensitivity of
some of the information on which the suspicion was based, of producing it in court.
Not only would the court have to sit in camera but neither the detained person nor his
legal advisers could be present or told any of the details. This would require a
fundamental and undesirable change in the law and procedure of the United Kingdom
under which an individual who is deprived of his liberty is entitled to be represented
by his legal advisers at any proceedings before a court relating to his detention. If
entrusted with the power to grant extensions of detention, the judges would be seen to
be exercising an executive rather than a judicial function. It would add nothing to the
safeguards against abuse ... and could lead to unanswerable criticism of the
judiciary. 14

111U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8, Right to Liberty and
Security of Persons, Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Annex V, 3 (June 30, 1982) [hereinafter HRC GC 8].
112 ICCPR, supranote 28, art. 9.4.
13 HRC GC 8, supra note 111, 2.
114 Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117,
56 (1988).
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In response, the European Court accepted that "the investigation of
terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the authorities with special
problems."' 1 5 It further agreed that, "subject to the existence of adequate
safeguards, the context of terrorism... has the effect of prolonging the
period during which the authorities may ... keep a person suspected of
serious terrorist offences in custody before bringing him before a
Even so, these difficulties could not justify "dispensing
judge ... .
altogether with 'prompt' judicial control." ' 1 7 The Court held that even a
being
detention as brief as four days and six hours, without the suspect's
' 8
1
"promptly."
of
test
the
meet
to
failed
judge,
brought before a
Both U.S. law and IHRL, "l 9 for good reason, guarantee suspects in
serious criminal cases the right to counsel. This right, however, poses a
further obstacle to prosecuting suspected terrorists. In the U.S. at least,
counsel routinely advise suspects in custody not to talk to police or
prosecutors. Thus prosecutors must obtain the evidentiary basis for pretrial
detention, and for eventual trial, from other sources, subject to all the
difficulties noted above.
Prompt access to counsel may also disrupt the psychodynamics of the
interrogation process. Successful interrogation may turn on the suspect's
developing a degree of rapport, even a relationship of dependency, with the
interrogator. That process takes time. If suspects believe they can turn
that
instead to their lawyers and to the courts for assistance, some argue
20
they are less likely to provide useful information to interrogators.1
These points were detailed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, in support of an
unsuccessful effort by the government to deny counsel access to Jose
Admiral Jacoby
Padilla, a U.S. citizen held in military detention.
explained:
DIA's approach to interrogation is largely dependent upon creating an atmosphere

of dependency and trust between the subject and the interrogator. Developing the
kind of relationship of trust and dependency necessary for effective interrogations is a
process that can take a significant amount of time. There are numerous examples of

115 Id.

61.

116 Id.
117

id.

18 Id.

62.

9 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (providing for right to counsel "at every stage of the
proceeding from initial appearance through appeal"); BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. V
("All persons deprived of liberty shall have the right to ... legal counsel ... without
delays ... from the time of their capture or arrest and necessarily before their first

declaration before the competent authority.").
120 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 598 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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situations where interrogators have been unable to obtain valuable intelligence from a
subject until months, or even years, after the interrogation process began.
Anything that threatens the perceived dependency and trust between the subject
and interrogator directly threatens the value of interrogation as an intelligencegathering tool. Even seemingly minor interruptions can have profound psychological
impacts on the delicate subject-interrogator relationship. Any insertion of counsel
into the subject-interrogator relationship, for example---even if only for a limited
duration or for a specific purpose-can undo months of work and may permanently
shut down the interrogation process. Therefore, it is critical to minimize external
influences on the interrogation process.121

The District Court was not persuaded. In the absence of any examples
of interrogations disrupted by access to counsel, or of specific information
about Padilla's interrogation, the Court viewed the Admiral's statements as
"speculative."'' 22 They were not "wrong"; indeed, they were "plausible,"
albeit not convincing. 123 In any event they could not overcome Padilla's
24

statutory right to counsel. 1
For suspects detained for purposes of criminal prosecution in the U.S.,
IHRL adds no new obstacles in this respect because the suspect is already
entitled by the U.S. Constitution to a lawyer's assistance while in custodial

interrogation. 125 But it is not clear that this constitutional safeguard protects
foreign suspects detained outside the U.S. 26 In such cases IHRL, which
protects persons outside the U.S. who are in the effective custody and
control of the U.S., 1 27 makes it difficult to interrogate a suspect long enough
to get good information before allowing him assistance of counsel and

bringing him "without delay" before a judge.
B. UNDER DEROGATION
One might imagine that by derogating from the right to liberty, or at
least from the requirement to bring suspects "without delay" before a judge,
a State could escape from the tight time periods allowed by IHRL for police

interrogation before suspected terrorists must be afforded access to counsel
and court.

But derogation does not gain police much more time.

121Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
122 Id. at 51-52.
123 Id. at 53.
124 Id. at 53-54.
125 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964).

126 Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (holding that
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect
aliens outside the U.S.) with Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (holding
that constitutional privilege of habeas corpus protects alien prisoners detained under de facto
U.S. sovereignty at Guantanamo).
127 HRC GC 31, supra note 58, 10.
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Derogation is not a carte blanche. Measures adopted under derogationsuch as pretrial detention without judicial control-must be no more longlasting than "strictly required" by the exigencies of the emergency
justifying derogation.128

A threshold obstacle is that a detainee's right to go before a judge,
secured by the writ of habeas corpus in common law systems, is nonderogable. Although the ICCPR does not list the rights to liberty and to
appear before a judge as non-derogable, 129 the U.N. Human Right
Committee takes the view that the right of access to a court is essential to
guarantee other non-derogable rights, such as the right not to be tortured.
Therefore, in the Committee's view, the right of access to a judge is itself
13 1
non-derogable.1 30 This view is in accord with the language of the ACHR 32
and with the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.'
Even if the right of access to a court is non-derogable, States may
nonetheless attempt to derogate from the requirement that such access be
afforded "promptly," or at least as promptly as would ordinarily be
required. If they succeed, this would allow police additional time to detain
a suspect before bringing him before a judge.
Additional time, yes, but not much. After British police detentions of
terrorists for periods as brief as four and a half days were invalidated by the
European Court, the UK derogated from the right to liberty under the
ECHR in order to authorize detention of terrorist suspects for up to seven
days without judicial supervision. In Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 133 the
European Court upheld this derogation measure. The Court stressed the
availability of safeguards, especially the detainee's access to habeas corpus,
his absolute and legally enforceable right of access to a lawyer within forty-

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.2.
130 HRC GC 29, supra note 80, 1 16.
'3 ACHR, supra note 41, art. 27.2 (establishing that States may not derogate from the
"judicial guarantees essential for the protection of... [non-derogable] rights.").
32 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situation, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, 1987 Inter-Am.
128

129

Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Oct. 6, 1987) (stating that habeas corpus is non-derogable).
133 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539 (1993).
The British statute did not purport to authorize
security detention in the sense used in this Article, i.e., not related to criminal prosecution.
Rather, the statute extended the time during which police could detain a suspect while
gathering evidence for criminal prosecution. Id. 13-17. But nothing in the court's opinion
suggests that it would have allowed a longer detention, or one with fewer procedural
safeguards, if there had been no connection to a possible criminal prosecution. Thus
Brannigan'sstrict scrutiny of the length and procedures for police detention may be taken to
apply, with at least equal force, to security detentions where no criminal prosecution is
contemplated.
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eight hours of detention, his right to inform a 134friend or relative of his
detention, and his right to have access to a doctor.
This was not much of a victory for police and prosecutors. Britain's
derogation gained only a few additional days before suspects had to be
brought before a judge. Even this extension depended in part on the
suspect's right to see a lawyer within forty-eight hours, as well as his right
to file a habeas petition.
Although it upheld British police detentions of up to seven days, the
European Court later ruled that the detentions without judicial control
135
authorized by Turkish derogations were too lengthy. In Aksoy v. Turkey,
the Court found that a detention of a suspected terrorist for fourteen days
without judicial supervision was "exceptionally long, and left the applicant
vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty but also
to torture."' 136 Moreover, the Government failed to adduce any "detailed
reasons... as to why the fight against terrorism.., rendered judicial
intervention impracticable."' 137 In subsequent cases the Court ruled against
38
Turkey's detentions of as few as eleven days without judicial supervision.'
Whether or not a State derogates from the right of detainees to be
brought promptly before a judge, then, the strict time limits for police
detention allowed by IHRL may make prosecution of suspected terrorists
very difficult. When police catch the suspect in the act, as in the shoe
bomber case discussed above, a conviction or guilty plea may be obtained
anyway. But in many cases, the obstacles to prosecution may lead States to
look for other, more practical ways to remove suspected terrorists from the
streets.
V. PREVENTIVE DETENTION FOR SECURITY PURPOSES:
In part to avoid legal constraints on pretrial detention of suspected
terrorists for prosecution, the U.S. and other States have resorted to
preventive detention of suspected terrorists as threats to security.
134 Id. 62-64.
135 [1996-IV] Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260.
136 Id. at 2282, 78.
137

Id.

138 Sen

v. Turkey, [2003] Eur. Ct. H.R. 41478/98,

28 (2003), available at

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=671607&portal=hbk
m&source=extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0 1C 1166DEA398649
(holding that eleven days detention without judicial intervention not justified under
derogation from Article 5); Demir v. Turkey, [1998] Eur. Ct. H.R. 21380/93, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=696107&portal=hbk
m&source=extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C 1166DEA398649
(holding that sixteen to twenty-three days incommunicado detention without judicial
supervision not justified under derogation from Article 5).

2008]

PRETRIAL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION

A. DETENTION FOR INTERROGATION
Suspects detained for security purposes are also interrogated for
intelligence purposes. However, it is important to distinguish preventive
detention for purposes of security from detention for purposes of
interrogation. Indefinite detention solely or primarily for purposes of
intelligence interrogation is probably not lawful under U.S. or international
law. 39 In the U.S., in response to an argument that the Congressional
resolution authorizing use of military force after 9/11 does not authorize
indefinite detention, a Supreme Court plurality commented, "Certainly, we
agree that ' indefinite
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not
140
authorized."
IHL also forbids indefinite detention for purposes of interrogation. In
the opinion of the Chairperson of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers, "The indefinite detention of prisoners of war and civilian
internees for purposes of continued interrogation is inconsistent with
the ... Geneva Conventions."' 14 1 An ICRC lawyer has likewise argued that
detention should never be permitted "for the sole purpose of intelligence
gathering, without
the person involved otherwise presenting a real threat to
1 42
State security.
In peacetime, IHRL does not explicitly forbid detention solely for
purposes of intelligence interrogation. But detention solely or primarily for
purposes of intelligence gathering may be "arbitrary" and thus violate
IHRL.
The two U.N. experts mentioned above concluded that at
Guantanamo, "Information obtained from reliable sources and the
interviews... with former Guantanamo Bay detainees confirm,.., that the
objective of the ongoing detention is not primarily to prevent combatants
139 This excludes persons subject to finite detentions for interrogation as possible
material witnesses in connection with criminal proceedings, which in the U.S. are governed
by statute. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2007); United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005). The concept of"security detention" used
here corresponds to the IHL terms used interchangeably by the ICRC, namely internment
and administrativedetention, except that they are used only for detentions in "armed conflict
and in other situations of violence." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 376.
140 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 509, 521 (2004).
141Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions et al., Report: Situation of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,

23 & n.23, delivered to the U.N. Comm. on Human Rights,

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter GuantanamoBay] (citing Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17(3), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter
Geneva III]; Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 31); see also Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 42
(permitting detention only if "absolutely necessary" for security), 78 (allowing detention
only if "necessary, for imperative reasons of security").
142 Pejic, supra note 30, at 380.

DOUGLASS CASSEL

[Vol. 98

from taking up arms against the United States again, but to obtain
information and gather intelligence on the AI-Qaida network."' 143 This
finding was one factor in their determination that "the ongoing detention of
Guantanamo Bay detainees as 'enemy combatants' does
in fact constitute
144
liberty.'
personal
to
right
the
of
deprivation
an arbitrary
If detention solely or primarily for interrogation is to be permitted at
all-a doubtful proposition-the IHRL proportionality standard discussed
in detail below suggests, at minimum, that both the probability of obtaining,
and the security value of expected intelligence, must be very high to
warrant prolonged detention.
B. PREVENTIVE DETENTION FOR SECURITY UNDER IHRL.
The general consensus of IHRL instruments on security detention was
summarized a quarter century ago by the Human Rights Committee, which
interpreted the ICCPR as follows:
[I]f so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security.., it must

not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by
law... information of the reasons must be given... and court control of the
detention must
be available ... as well as compensation in the case of a
'45
breach ....

The prohibition on "arbitrary" detention has both a substantive and a
procedural dimension. The substantive dimension requires, among other
things, that detentions be proportionalto their security justification. 46 In
his treatise on the ICCPR, Manfred Nowak reports that the majority of
delegates in the ICCPR drafting debates stressed that the concept of
"arbitrary"
contained
"elements
of
injustice,
unpredictability,
unreasonableness, capriciousness and disproportionality, as well as the
Anglo-American principle of due process of law."' 147 Taking into account
this "historical background," Nowak concludes that "the prohibition of
arbitrariness is to be interpreted broadly.
Cases of deprivation of
liberty.., must
not be
manifestly
disproportional,
unjust
or
unpredictable ....,148
Even under derogation from the right to liberty, IHRL treaty
derogation provisions require that security detention must be proportional,
that is, no more restrictive or long-lasting than "strictly required" by the

143

GuantanamoBay, supra note 141,

144

Id. 20.

145HRC GC 8, supra note 111,

23.

4.
BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 111.2.
147 NOWAK, supranote 96, at 225, 29.
148 Id. at 225, 30.
146
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exigencies of the situation. 49 This is consistent with IHL substantive
standards, which allow security detention of foreign nationals in a party's
territory only if "absolutely necessary" to security,' 50 or in occupied
5
territory only if "necessary, for imperative reasons for security.' '
Interpreting the ECHR "proportionality" requirement for derogations,
the British Law Lords explain:
In determining whether a limitation is arbitrary or excessive, the court must ask
itself:
Whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair
the right or freedom
52
are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.

Prevention of terrorism is plainly a "sufficiently important" legislative
goal to justify limiting personal liberty. Preventive detention is "rationally
connected" to the goal. The issue is whether the means, deprivation of a
fundamental right to liberty,' 53 are "no more than is necessary."
The prohibition of arbitrary detention also has a procedural dimension.
In a 2002 legal opinion on U.S. security detentions, the U.N. Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention considered two persons allegedly detained on
U.S. territory for fourteen months in solitary confinement, without being
officially informed of any charges, without being able to communicate with
their families, and without a court being asked to rule on the lawfulness of
their detention. The Working Group found their detentions "arbitrary," in
view of ICCPR articles 9 and 14, which "guarantee, respectively, the right

149 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1 ("to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation"); ECHR, supra note 39, art. 15.1 (same); ACHR, supra note 41, art. 27.1 ("to the
extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"). The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recognizes that deprivation of liberty may be
justified in connection with the "administration of state authority" outside the criminal
justice context where such measures are "strictly necessary." Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights, OAE/Ser.L/V/I.1 16, doc. 5, rev. 1 corr.,
124 (Oct. 22,
2002) [hereinafter Report on Terrorism and Human Rights].
150 Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 42.
151 Id. art. 78.
152 A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2004] UKHL
56, 30.
153 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001) ("Freedom from
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraintlies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects."); A., [2004] UKHL 56,
190 (Lord Walker, J.) (noting "one of the most fundamental human freedoms-freedom
from imprisonment for an indefinite period, without indictment, trial or conviction on a
criminal charge").
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to a review of the lawfulness of detention by a competent judicial authority
and the right to a fair trial. 154
The Working Group also addressed the situation of persons detained at
Guantanamo Bay. In the absence of a determination of their prisoner of war
status by a competent tribunal, and without the procedural guarantees of
ICCPR articles 9 and 14 having been afforded to detainees not determined
the Working Group found the Guantanamo detentions to be
to be POWs,
155

"arbitrary."

In sum, detentions are prohibited as "arbitrary" by IHRL, either
because they are disproportionate or otherwise substantively unreasonable,
or because they are procedurally deficient.
C. SECURITY DETENTION UNDER IHL
In international armed conflict, Geneva IV allows internment of
foreign nationals in a State's territory only if "absolutely necessary" to
occupied territory only if "necessary, for imperative reasons
security, or in
156
of security."
These demanding standards, however, apply only to "protected
persons" under Geneva IV.1 57 They do not apply to the detaining State's
nationals, or to citizens of neutral or co-belligerent States that maintain
normal diplomatic relations with the detaining State.15 8 These citizens were
omitted from protection because the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
predate modem IHRL, assumed that sovereign States could be left
unencumbered to protect their own citizens. Not until after IHRL treaties
were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s 159 did Article 75 of Additional Geneva
Protocol I of 1977 grant even minimal protections to non-enemy citizens
1 60
who are "detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict.
Yet Article 75 did not specify the permissible grounds for such
detention. Detainees who are not "protected persons" under IHL are thus
left to the protection of IHRL with respect to the grounds of detention,
namely that the detention not be arbitrary and that it be proportional and
based on grounds and procedures previously established by law. The
154 U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8 (Dec. 16, 2002).
155Id.
156 Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 42, 78. The ICRC derives from these Articles the

general principle that "Internment/administrative

detention is an exceptional measure."

ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 380.
157 Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 42, 78.
158 Id.art. 4.
159The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and went into force in 1976. See supra note 28.
160 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 75.6.
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resulting protection against unnecessary deprivation of liberty under IHRL
is comparable to that which the 1949 Geneva Convention (Geneva IV)
provides to "protected persons."
Both aspects of the IHRL ban on arbitrary detentions-substantive and
procedural-are consistent with IHL. The proportionality requirement is
consistent with the Geneva IV detention standards of "absolutely
necessary" or "necessary, for imperative reasons of security." It is further
consistent with the Geneva IV requirements of periodic review of the
justification for detention, 61 and of mandatory release as soon as the needs
62
of security allow.'
From the IHL standards for detention, and from IHL rules against
collective punishment, the ICRC derives the general principle that
"Internment or administrative detention can only be ordered on an
individual case-by-case basis ....
The IHRL requirement of
proportionality is consistent with this IHL principle as well.
Security detention in international armed conflict must also be nondiscriminatory,' 64 including as between citizens and foreigners. 65 This
does not mean that there can be no distinction based on nationality; as noted
above, the very definition of "protected person" under Geneva IV turns on
the nationality of the detainee. However, any difference in treatment based
on nationality must be justified by "very weighty reasons." 166 In the case of
Geneva IV, these reasons reflect the relevant purpose of IHL in 1949-to
protect citizens of one party to the conflict from detentions by an opposing
party unless "absolutely necessary" to security-while leaving a State's
own citizens to its presumed solicitude, and leaving citizens of neutral or
' 67
co-belligerent States to the shelter of "normal diplomatic relations."'
In non-international armed conflict, Additional Protocol II
contemplates that persons may be deprived of liberty "for reasons related to

161Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 43, 78.

Id. arts. 43, 132; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 75(3). The ICRC asserts the
general principle that "Intemment/administrative detention must cease as soon as the reasons
for it cease to exist." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 382.
163ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 381.
'64ICCPR, supra note 28, arts. 2.1, 26; ACHR, supra note 41, arts. 1.1, 24; ADHR,
supra note 43, art. II; ACHPR, supra note 47, arts. 2, 3; BP, supra note 37, 5.1; BP
Americas, supra note 46, princ. II. The ICRC likewise adopts the general principle that
"Internment/administrative detention can only be ordered on an individual case-by-case
basis, without discrimination of any kind." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 381.
165See A v Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2004] UKHL 56,
45-69; HRC GC 29,
supra note 80, 8.
166 A., [2004] UKHL 56, 48; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 364, 42 (1996).
167Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 4.
162
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the armed conflict,"'' 68 but does not spell out on what grounds this may
occur. IHRL therefore governs in this IHL vacuum: the detention must not
be arbitrary and must be proportional and based on grounds previously
established by law.
D. SECURITY DETENTION OUTSIDE OF EUROPE
Outside Europe, the question is not whether security detention of
suspected terrorists is permitted, but whether it meets the IHRL criteria
summarized above, or satisfies comparable IHL criteria in wartime. The
detention must not be arbitrary or disproportionate (i.e., it must be no more
than strictly necessary to the objective of preventing terrorism), it must rest
70
on grounds 169 and procedures
previously established by law, and it must
71
not be discriminatory.
Is prolonged or indefinite deprivation of the fundamental right of
liberty, without criminal charge or conviction, ever a proportionate response
to terrorism? If so, the proportionality of the detention, and hence its
lawfulness under IHRL, depends in part on whether there is sufficient
evidence against a particular suspect.172 But how much evidence is
enough? Here we encounter a notable gap in current IHRL: the absence of
a standard for the quantum or quality of evidence needed to justify 17a3
security detention. A standard of "some evidence" is palpably too low.
So is a standard of mere "reasonable suspicion," which is the standard
required by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for police to
conduct a brief "stop and frisk.', 17 4 A standard of "credible evidence"
168Geneva Protocol II, supra note 54, art. 5.1.

169 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1; ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.2 ("No one shall be
deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons ... established beforehand by the
constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.");
ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 6 ("No one may be deprived of his freedom except for
reasons... previously laid down by law."); ADHR, supra note 43, art. XXV ("No person
may be deprived of his liberty except in the cases and according to the procedures
established by pre-existing law.").

The ICRC asserts the general principle that "Internment/administrative detention must
conform to the principle of legality." In this context, the principle of legality "means that a
person may be deprived of liberty only for reasons (substantive aspect) and in accordance
with procedures (procedural aspect) that are provided for by domestic and international law."
ICRC Guidelines, supranote 30, at 383.
170 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1.
' A., [2004] UKHL 56,
46, 67.
172 See BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 111.2 (noting that "sufficient evidentiary
elements" are required for any preventive detention of liberty).
173Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 509, 537 (2004) (noting that the "some evidence"
standard is "inadequate" because it is a "standard of review, not a standard of proof').
174Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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should, at most, merely shift the burden to the detainee to refute the
government's evidence. 175 A standard of "probable cause," enough to
justify an arrest or search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, seems
hardly sufficient for a prolonged deprivation of liberty. Arguably nothing
less than a "preponderance of the evidence," the standard for civil liability,
should 176
be required to justify a prolonged or indefinite deprivation of
liberty.

Whatever the standard for an initial, brief detention-perhaps
"probable cause"-proportionality counsels that the standard should be
higher for a prolonged detention.
But how much higher? IHRL
jurisprudence needs to fill this gap with a standard
sufficiently respectful of
77
the fundamental nature of the right to liberty.
E. SECURITY DETENTION IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES
In Europe the legal restrictions on security detention are stricter.
ECHR Article 5, which guarantees the right to liberty, prohibits preventive
detention for security purposes. If security detention in Europe is permitted
at all, it is allowed only by derogation from Article 5.
In its very first judgment in 1961, the European Court of Human
Rights upheld Ireland's security detention of an IRA activist, carried out by
derogation from Article 5.178 Four decades later, however, the British Law
Lords interpreted the ECHR and ruled that a British law allowing security
detention of foreign nationals, enacted by derogation from Article 5, failed
the tests of proportionality and non-discrimination required of derogations,
and was thus incompatible with the ECHR. 179 In light of the recent British
ruling, as well as recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, it
is unclear whether prolonged security detention can still be justified by
derogation from the ECHR.
1. Right to Liberty Under the ECHR
Unlike the other IHRL instruments considered here, the ECHR
enumerates an exclusive list of permissible grounds for detention. Article
5.1 provides, "No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

175The Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi suggested that credible evidence should

suffice to shift the burden to the detainee to rebut the evidence that he is an enemy
combatant. 542 U.S. at 534.
176 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 550 (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (citing
standard used by army regulations for military tribunals to determine prisoner of war status).
177See supra note 154.
178Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, no. 3), 15 (1961).
179A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2004] UKHL 56.
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cases" and then lists six grounds. 180 Only two are plausibly relevant to
security detention. However, neither was intended, or has been interpreted,
to permit security detention.
The first is Article 5.1 (b), which authorizes detention "in order to
secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law." This refers,
however, to a specific legal obligation, such as the duty to perform military
service or file a tax return. 18 ' It does not extend to "obligations to comply
of the
with the law generally, so that it does not justify preventive 8detention
2
sort that a state might introduce in an emergency situation."'
The other facially relevant provision is Article 5.1 (c), which authorizes
detention "when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent [a
provision "concerns only
person's] committing an offence." However, this183
law."'
criminal
the
of
enforcement
the
detention in
In the 1961 Lawless judgment, the European Court of Human Rights
considered Ireland's detention of an IRA activist for five months under a
statute, activated only in emergencies, that authorized a Minister of State to
order detention whenever the Minister "is of opinion that any particular
person is engaged in activities which, in his opinion, are prejudicial to the
' 84
preservation of public peace and order or to the security of the State."'
The Minister of Justice ordered Lawless detained because Lawless was, in
his opinion, engaged in such activities.' 85

180 ECHR, supra note 39, art. 5.1 provides:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the
lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or
detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure
the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable
suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor
by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose
of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or
drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a
view to deportation or extradition.
181 DAVID JOHN HARRIS, MICHAEL O'BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 112-13 (1995).
182 Id. at 113 n.3 (citing Lawless, I Eur. Ct. H.R.,

H.R. (ser. A, no. 39) 333, 101 (1980)).
113 Id.at 117.
184 Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at pt. III,
15

Id. at pt. VI,

20.

12(1).

15, 51; Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. Ct.
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The European Court ruled that the security detention could not be
justified by Article 5.1(c) of the ECHR.186 Commenting on the ruling, one
group of scholars explains that even though the language of Article 5.1 (c):
[A]t first sight.., could be read as authorizing a general power of preventive
detention ... [t]his interpretation was rejected in Lawless v. Ireland, as "leading to
conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of the Convention.".. . [T]he
Court rejected the defendant government's argument that the detention of the
applicant, a suspected IRA activist, under a statute that permitted the internment of
persons "engaged in activities ... prejudicial to the ... security of the state," could be
justified as being "necessary to prevent his committing an offence".... [T]he
the statute was not effected with the purpose of
detention of an interned person under
87
initiating a criminal prosecution.1

In this judgment, signed by eminent human rights jurist Ren6 Cassin,
among other judges, the Court repudiated security detention in strong terms.
If Article 5.1 (c) were not read restrictively, the Court warned:
anyone suspected of harbouring an intent to commit an offence could be arrested and
detained for an unlimited period on the strength merely of an executive decision... ;
(whereas] [s]uch an assumption, with all its implications of arbitrary power, would
188
lead to conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of the Convention ....

Correctly interpreted, then, as the Court explained in a later case
involving a suspected mafioso, Article 5.1 (c) does not authorize:
[A] policy of general prevention directed against an individual or a category of
individuals who, like mafiosi, present a danger on account of their continuing
the contracting [parties] a means of
propensity to crime; it does no more than afford
189
preventing a concrete and specified offence.

Thus, while article 5.1(c) may authorize "preventive detention" for
purpose of criminal law enforcement in regard to a particular crime, it is not
relevant to "security detention" in the sense of preventive detention for
security purposes, rather than for purposes of criminal prosecution.
2. Derogationfrom the ECHR Right to Liberty
After rejecting security detention as a violation of the right to liberty,
the Court in Lawless then considered whether the detention was justified by
virtue of the Irish government's derogation from Article 5, and concluded
that it was. 190

186 Id.
8-15.
187 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 181 (footnotes omitted) (citing Lawless,

I Eur. Ct. H.R.,
51-53).
188 Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R., 14.
189 Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, no. 39), 333,
20-47.
190 Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at pt. VI,

102 (1980).
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The substantive standard for derogation from the ECHR appears in
Article 15.1:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that 19
such
1 measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law.

Pursuant to this provision, the Court framed the substantive question as
whether the Irish security detention measure was "strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation."1' 92 The Court noted that some members of the
European Commission of Human Rights believed the security detention
was not necessary because the Irish government could have used a variety
of alternatives instead, including bringing an ordinary criminal prosecution
or a prosecution before special criminal courts or military courts, or sealing
the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.
In the Court's view, however, none of these means was adequate to
deal with the situation confronting Ireland in 1957. The "military, secret
and terrorist" nature of the IRA, the fear it inspired in witnesses, and the
fact that most of its activities were cross-border raids into Northern Ireland,
caused "great difficulties" in gathering evidence for any sort of criminal
prosecution. Sealing the border would have imposed "extremely serious
repercussions on the population as a whole.' 93
"Moreover," the Court noted, the Irish security detention law had a
number of "safeguards designed to prevent
abuses in the operation of the
w 94
system of administrative detention:
* The Act was subject to constant supervision by Parliament, which
not only received detailed reports but could also, at any time, annul the
government's declaration triggering the emergency powers of security
detention.
* A "Detention Commission" consisting of a military officer and
two judges had been set up, which could hear complaints from
detainees and, if its opinion was favorable to release, was binding on
the government.
* The ordinary courts could compel the Detention Commission to
carry out its functions.
* The government publicly announced that it would release any
detainee who gave an undertaking to respect the law and the security
191ECHR, supra note 39, art. 15.1.
192 Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at pt. III,
193Id. 36.
194Id. 37.

31.
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act. This was a government commitment which the European Court
considered to be legally binding, and
that led to the release of Lawless
195
after he gave such an undertaking.
"Subject to the foregoing safeguards," the Court concluded, the
security detention appeared
to be a measure strictly required by the
196
exigencies of the situation.
One may question, however, whether the nearly half-century-old
judgment in Lawless affords continuing assurance of the validity of
prolonged security detention by derogation from the ECHR. In part the
doubt arises from the very short time periods, no more than a week or so,
now allowed by the European Court for police detention of suspected
terrorists in criminal cases, even under derogations from the right to
liberty.1 97
In part, too, doubt arises from the rejection of security detention, even
under derogation, in a recent judgment of the highest court of Britain,
which interpreted the ECHR in light of the jurisprudence of the European
Court. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the British
government derogated from ECHR Article 5 in order to impose prolonged
security detention on foreign nationals suspected of international terrorism,
who could not or would not be deported. 198 Under the legislative scheme,
foreign citizens suspected of involvement in international terrorism, but not
equally suspect British citizens, could be indefinitely detained, until such
time as the government or the detainee could find another country willing to
accept them. 199
In A. and Others v. Secretary of State, decided in 2004, the House of
Lords heard a challenge to this scheme, which they deemed to be a security
detention system. 200 The Law Lords evaluated the system in light of the
derogation provisions of the ECHR,2 °' which they considered to have the
same effect as those of the ICCPR with regard to discrimination. 20 2 Even
195Id. 27.
196

Id.

38.

197See supra Part IV.
198A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., [2004] UKHL 56, (2004),

11.

199Id.

12.

200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

55.
16.
46 ("The United Kingdom did not derogate from art 14 of the European

Convention (or from art 26 of the ICCPR, which corresponds to it) ....), 62 ("The

Attorney General ...accepted that art 14 of the European Convention and art 26 of the
ICCPR are to the same effect."), 67 ("To do so was a violation of art 14. It was also a
violation of art 26 of the ICCPR and so inconsistent with the United Kingdom's other
obligations under international law within the meaning of art 15 of the European
Convention."), 68(4) ("[A]rt 4(1) of the ICCPR, in requiring that a measure introduced in

DOUGLASS CASSEL

[Vol. 98

though the British scheme had more procedural safeguards than those
employed decades earlier by the Irish government in Lawless,20 3 the Law
Lords adjudged it to be both disproportionate and discriminatory, and hence
incompatible with the ECHR.2 °4 Accordingly, as it was authorized to do by
the Human Rights Act, the Court so advised the government. °5
Whether indefinite security detention under derogation from the right
to liberty could secure judicial approval in Europe today, as opposed to
1961 when Lawless was decided, is thus open to some doubt. Of the nine
Law Lords who heard A. v. Secretary of State, only one voted to uphold the
detention. Even he, however, seemed to imply that he might not sustain a
system of security detention if it were applied to British citizens:

derogation from Covenant obligations must not discriminate, does not include nationality,
national origin or "other status" among the forbidden grounds of discrimination
...However, by art. 2 of the ICCPR the states parties undertake to respect and ensure to all
individuals within the territory the rights in the Covenant "without distinction of any kind,
such as race ...national or social origin ...or other status". Similarly, art. 26 guarantees

equal protection against discrimination "on any ground such as race,... national or social
origin ... or other status". This language is broad enough to embrace nationality and
immigration status. It is open to states to derogate from arts. 2 and 26 but the United
Kingdom has not done so. If, therefore, as I have concluded, art. 23 discriminates against
the Appellants on grounds of their nationality or immigration status, there is a breach of arts.
2 and 26 of the ICCPR and so a breach of the UK's "other obligations under international
law" within the meaning of art. 15 of the European Convention.").
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.1 provides:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which
is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin.
203 As Lord Walker, dissenting in A. v. Sec 'y of State, explained:
[T]he 2001 Act contains several important safeguards against oppression. The exercise of the
Secretary of State's powers is subject to judicial review by SIAC, an independent and impartial
court, which under ...
the 2001 Act has a wide jurisdiction to hear appeals, and must also review
every certificate granted... [for security detention] at regular intervals. Moreover the
legislation is temporary in nature. Any decision to prolong it is anxiously considered by the
legislature. While it is in force there is detailed scrutiny of the operation of.,. [security
detentions] by the individual (at present Lord Carlisle QC) appointed [as
ombudsman] ....There is also a wider review by the Committee of Privy Councillors ....All
these safeguards seem to me to show a genuine determination that the 2001 Act, and especially
Pt 4 [on security detentions], should not be used to encroach on human rights any more than is
strictly necessary.
A., [2004] UKHL 56, 215.
204 Id.
43 (proportionality), 67 (discriminatory), 72 (declaration of incompatibility
with ECHR on both grounds).
205 Id. 72.
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[I1nteming British citizens without trial, and with no option of going abroad if they
chose to do so, would be far more oppressive, and a graver affront to their human
rights, than a power to detain in "a prison with three walls" a suspected terrorist who
has no right of abode in the United Kingdom, and whom the government could
and
2 06
would deport but for the risk of torture if he were returned to his own country.

The core flaw in the British system was discrimination.

Foreign

citizens suspected of international terrorism could be detained indefinitely,
whereas British citizens could not. This disparity served also to highlight
that the detention was disproportionate: if security did not require indefinite
detention of British citizens suspected of terrorism, then why did it require
indefinite detention of foreign citizens?

Not only heightened judicial sensitivity to the right to liberty, but also
changing technology, may cast doubt on the continued validity of Lawless.
The Law Lords in A. v. Secretary of State were intrigued by the attraction of
electronic restraints as an alternative to imprisonment. They noted that

when one security prisoner was released on bail, it was on condition:
[T]hat he wear an electronic monitoring tag at all times; that he remain at his premises
at all times; that he telephone a named security company five times each day at
specified times; that he permit the company to install monitoring equipment at his
premises; that he limit entry to his premises to his family, his solicitor, his medical
attendants and other approved persons; that he make no contact with any other person;
that he have on his premises no computer equipment, mobile telephone or other
electronic communications device; that he cancel the existing telephone link to his
premises; and that he install a dedicated telephone link permitting contact only with
the security company.207

The Court hinted strongly that such a system of restraints would more
likely survive its scrutiny: "The Appellants suggested that conditions of this
kind, strictly enforced, would effectively inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard
20 8
to see why this would not be so.

When the legislation was subsequently revised, it incorporated
conditions of this kind. But after several detainees thus placed under house

arrest managed to abscond, some British police continue to call for
extending the maximum period of detention prior to charging terrorism
suspects, currently twenty-eight days, to allow for indefinite security
detention. 209 As of this writing, however, even a far more modest proposal

206 Id. 213 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorp).
207

Id. 35.

208 Id.

See also BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 11.4 ("American States shall establish
by law a series of alternative or substitute measures for deprivation of liberty.").
209 E.g., Mark Townsend & Jamie Doward, Lock Terror Suspects Up Indefinitely Say
Police, OBSERVER, July 15, 2007, at 1. By late 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown was
considering introducing legislation to extend the twenty-eight-day period to fifty-six days.
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by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, to extend the twenty-eight day period to
forty-two days in individual cases subject to parliamentary review, has yet
to overcome opposition from his own party as well as the opposition in

Parliament.2 l0
In sum, the ECHR does not permit security detention in ordinary
times. Even in national emergencies, when States derogate from the right
to liberty, the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights and the British House of Lords casts doubt on whether indefinite or
prolonged security detention is ever a proportional response to terrorism.
VI. PROCEDURES FOR SECURITY DETENTION

Where security detention is allowed at all, the procedures for its use
must be previously established by law. 21 I

They must also include the

following procedural safeguards:
A. REGISTRATION

The detention must be registered.2 12 There must be no "prisoners
without a name in cells without a number. ' ' 2 13 Indeed, under IHL, "[t]he

Sarah Lyall, British Intelligence Chief Sharpens Intelligence Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2007,
at A3.
210
A. Travis, Terrorism: Lords Say 42-Day Law Will Put Fair Trials at Risk, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 5, 2008, at 4; James Kirkup, MP Promises Rebellion on 42-Day
Detention, DAILY TELEGRAPH, April 2, 2008, at 14.
211 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.1 ("No one shall be deprived of his liberty except.., in
accordance with such procedures as are established by law."); ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.2
("No one shall be deprived of his liberty except... under the conditions established
beforehand by the Constitution... or by a law...."); ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 6 ("No
one shall be deprived of his freedom except for ...conditions previously laid down by
law."); ADHR, supra note 43, art. XXV ("No person may be deprived of his liberty
except.. . according to the procedures established by pre-existing law."); BP, supra note 37,
art. 2 ("[D]etention ...shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose."). The ICRC
treats this procedural requirement as the procedural aspect of the more generally applicable
"principle of legality." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 383.
Although as noted in the preceding text the ECHR'does not allow security detention
except, perhaps, by derogation. ECHR, supra note 39, art. 5.1 states generally, "No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save ... in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law."
In view of the emphasis in Lawless on the procedural "safeguards" for the Irish security
detention under derogation from Article 5, one might expect the European Court, if it were
to allow a security detention under derogation today, to require that it be done pursuant to a
procedure prescribed by law. See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, no. 3), 15
(1961).
212 "The prohibitions against... unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation.
The absolute nature of these prohibitions, even in times of emergency, is justified by their
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entire system of detention ...is based on the idea that detainees must be
recognized places of detention accessible,
registered and held in officially
'2 14
in particular, to the ICRC."
B. COMMUNICATIONS
The detention must not be incommunicado for more than a few days.215
The prisoner should be entitled to communicate with family and counsel.2 16
status as norms of general international law." HRC GC 29, supra note 80,
supra note 37, art. 12 provides:

13(b). BP,

1. There shall be duly recorded: (a) The reasons for the arrest; (b) The time of the arrest and the
taking of the arrested person to a place of custody as well as that of his first appearance before a
judicial or other authority; (c) The identity of the law enforcement officials concerned;
(d) Precise information concerning the place of custody. 2. Such records shall be communicated
to the detained person, or his counsel, if any, in the form prescribed by law.
See also BP Americas, supra note 46, princs. 111.1 ("The law shall prohibit, in all
circumstances,.., secret deprivation of liberty since [it] ...constitute[s] cruel and inhuman

treatment."), IX. 1 (admission), IX.2 (registration).
213 See JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER

(Toby Talbot trans., Knopf 1981).
214 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 385.
Asserting the generally applicable
registered
and held in a recognized place of
of
the
"[r]ight
to
be
procedural safeguard
internment/administrative detention," the ICRC explains that this reflects numerous IHL
requirements of registration, notification to family and national authorities, and visits to
places of detention. Id. at 384-85 (citing Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 106, 107, 136, 137,
138 & 143).
215 BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. 111.1 ("The law shall prohibit, in all
circumstances, incommunicado detention of persons since ...[it] constitute[s] cruel and
inhuman treatment."); BP, supra note 37, art. 15 ("Notwithstanding the exceptions contained
in principle 16, paragraph 4, and principle 18, paragraph 3, communication of the detained or
imprisoned person with the outside world, and in particular his family or counsel, shall not
be denied for more than a matter of days."). The exceptions referenced provide as follows:
BP, supra note 37, art. 16.4 requires that "Any notification referred to in the present
principle [such as to consular authorities] shall be made or permitted to be made without
delay. The competent authority may however delay a notification for a reasonable period
where exceptional needs of the investigation so require." BP Americas, supra note 46, art.
18.3 establishes that:
The right of a detained or imprisoned person to be visited by and to consult and communicate,
without delay or censorship and in full confidentiality, with his legal counsel may not be
suspended or restricted save in exceptional circumstances, to be specified by law or lawful
regulations, when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other authority in order to
maintain security and good order.
Moreover:
[T]he mere subjection of an individual to prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication
is in itself cruel and inhuman treatment which harms the psychological and moral integrity of the
person, and violates the right of every detainee.., to treatment respectful of his dignity.
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 4, 1 187
(July 29, 1988).
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C. NOTICE OF REASONS AND CONSULAR RIGHTS

The detaining authorities must inform the detainee of the reasons for
her detention 21 7 and, if she is foreign, of her right to communicate with her
consulate for assistance.21 8

216 BP Americas, supra note 46, princs. V (counsel), XVIII

(family and legal

representatives), art. 19 ("A detained or imprisoned person shall have the right to be visited
by and to correspond with, in particular, members of his family and shall be given adequate
opportunity to communicate with the outside world, subject to reasonable conditions and
restrictions as specified by law or lawful regulations."). The ICRC asserts that "[a]n
internee/administrative detainee must be allowed to have contacts with-to correspond with
and be visited by-members of his or her family." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 38990 (citing Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 106, 107, & 116 and Geneva Protocol II, supra
note 54, art. 5(2)(b)). The ICRC acknowledges that IHL assures this right "in all but very
exceptional circumstances," citing Geneva IV, art. 5, which provides:
[w]here in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected
person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such
individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present
Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the
security of such State. Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as
a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the
Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires,
be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.
Id. While this may foreclose the expansive "rights of communication" under GC IV-which
include family visits-it does not by terms or by logic foreclose the more limited IHRL
rights of communication in State Parties to IHRL treaties, which do not necessarily include
family visits, but which do forbid prolonged incommunicado detention.
217 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.2 ("Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the
time of his arrest, of the reasons for his arrest ....
). This part of Article 9.2 is applicable to
all deprivations of liberty. See HRC GC 8, supra note 11,
1. Similar provisions are in
ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.4 ("Anyone who is detained shall be informed promptly of the
reasons for his detention .... "); BP, supra note 37, art. 10 ("Anyone who is arrested shall be
informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest .... "); and BP Americas, supra
note 46, princ. V (citing Geneva Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 75.3). The ICRC asserts a
generally applicable procedural safeguard of a "[flight to information about the reasons for
internment/administrative detention." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 384.
218 BP, supra note 37, art. 16.2:
If a detained or imprisoned person is a foreigner, he shall also be promptly informed of his
right to communicate by appropriate means with a consular post or the diplomatic mission of the
State of which he is a national or which is otherwise entitled to receive such communication in
accordance with international law or with the representative of the competent international
organization, if he is a refugee or is otherwise under the protection of an intergovemmental
organization.
See BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. V; see also La Grand (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
466 (June 27); The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, Advisory Opinion OC16/99, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1 1999); ICRC Guidelines, supra note
30, at 385.
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D. JUDICIAL CONTROL

The detention must be subject to prompt and effective judicial
control, 2' 9 at least where requested by the detainee. The detainee must be
entitled to bring proceedings before a court to decide without delay on the
lawfulness of her detention.2 2 ° This right is non-derogable.221 There is
219 ACHR, supra note 41, art. 7.5 ("Any person detained shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released .... "); BP, supra note 37, arts. 4
("Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting the human rights of a
person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be ordered by, or be subject to the
effective control of, a judicial or other authority."), 11.1 ("A person shall not be kept in
detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or
other authority"), 11.3 ("A judicial or other authority shall be empowered to review as
appropriate the continuance of detention."); BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. V ("Every
person deprived of liberty shall, at all times and in all circumstances, have the right to the
protection of and regular access to competent, independent, and impartial judges and
tribunals, previously established by law.").
220 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.4 ("Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention
is not lawful."). This provision, "i.e. the right to control by a court of the legality of the
detention, applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention." HRC GC 8,
supra note 111, 1 1. Provisions similar to ICCPR art. 9.4 include ACHR, supra note 41, art.
7.6; ADHR, supra note 43, art. XXV; ECHR, supra note 39, art. 5.4 ("Everyone who is
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided."); BP, supra note 37, arts. 11.1 ("A person
shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard
promptly by a judicial or other authority."), 32.1 ("A detained person or his counsel shall be
entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law before a judicial or other
authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to obtain his release without
delay, if it is unlawful."). The ACPHR, supra note 47, is less explicit but does provide
generally in Article 7.1(a) that every individual has the "right to an appeal to competent
national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights .... "
221 HRC GC 29, supra note 80, 16 ("In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right
to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the
lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party's decision to derogate from
the Covenant."). ACHR, supra note 41, art. 27.2 lists, in addition to other non-derogable
rights such as the right to life and to humane treatment, "the judicial guarantees essential for
the protection of such rights." The Inter-American Court of Human Rights identifies habeas
corpus as one of those "non-derogable judicial guarantees." Adv Op. OC-9/87, Habeas
Corpus in Emergency Situations, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, 1987 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 9 (Oct. 6, 1987).
The ICRC derives from IHL the procedural safeguards that, "[a] person subject to
internment/administrative detention has the right to challenge, with the least possible delay,
the lawfulness of his or her detention," and "[r]eview of the lawfulness of
internment/administrative detention must be carried out by an independent and impartial
body." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 385-86. In State Parties to IHRL treaties that
make judicial review of detention non-derogable, these IHL rules allowing review by an
independent and impartial administrative body should yield to the "more favourable" IHRL
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arguably a gap in protection by means of judicial control, insofar as IHRL
treaties do not expressly mandate periodic judicial review of detention.
However, they may reasonably be interpreted to require periodic judicial
22
review.

E. FAIR JUDICIAL HEARING ON DETENTION
The hearing in which a detainee contests the lawfulness of his
detention must be fair and public, before an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.223 A fair hearing affording due process of law
must, at minimum, give a security detainee "notice of the factual basis for
his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. ''224 Arguably it must also ensure
the right to counsel for the detainee.22 5
requirement of judicial review. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 75.8. This also
reflects the fact that the IHL option of a "court or administrative board," Geneva IV, supra
note 49, art. 43, adopted in 1949, was meant to allow "sufficient flexibility to take into
account the usage in different States." ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 75, Commentary on
Geneva IV, 260. Once States subsequently became parties to the ICCPR (entered into
force in 1976), ECHR (entered into force in 1953), and ACHR (entered into force in 1978),
their "usage" incorporated the more demanding IHRL requirement of judicial review. There
remains the exception of force majeure: where by reason of armed conflict, courts are not
open and functioning, administrative review necessarily takes the place of judicial review,
until the courts reopen. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
222 See BP, supra note 37, art. 11.3 ("A judicial or other authority shall be empowered
to
review as appropriate the continuance of detention."); BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. VI
(periodic judicial control); Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 149, 124
("Detention in such circumstances must also be subject to supervisory judicial control
without delay and, in instances when the state has justified continuing detention, at
reasonable intervals."). Pejic asserts the procedural safeguard, "[a]n internee/administrative
detainee has the right to periodical review of the lawfulness of continued detention." Pejic,
supra note 30, at 388 (citing Geneva IV, supra note 49, arts. 43, 78).
223 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 14.1; ECHR, supra note 39, art. 6.1; ACHR, supra note
41, art. 8.1; ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 7.1; BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. V. Pejic
would add the procedural safeguard that "[a]n internee/administrative detainee and his or her
legal representative should be able to attend the proceedings in person." Pejic, supra note
30, at 389. However, she acknowledges that "neither humanitarian nor human rights treaty
law expressly mention" this right. Id. The present writer therefore does not include it in the
IHRL consensus of instruments, even as amplified by IHL.
224 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). Although this requirement was stated
as a matter of due process of law under the U.S. Constitution, the IHRL ban on "arbitrary"
detentions, as noted in Part V.b, supra, has a procedural dimension and incorporates the
concept of due process of law. Accord BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. V. See also AlMarri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (per curiam), and 253, 262-76 (Traxler, J.,
concurring) (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (remanding habeas petition brought by alleged enemy
combatant for further proceedings in which government must present best available evidence
and allow detainee to confront and question witnesses against him, unless government can
show that such additional process would be impractical, unduly burdensome or would harm
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Beyond the foregoing procedural requirements, the U.N. Body of
Principles envisions an additional safeguard: "In order to supervise the
strict observance of relevant laws and regulations, places of detention shall

be visited regularly by qualified and experienced persons appointed by, and
responsible to, a competent authority distinct from the authority directly in
charge of the administration of the place of detention or imprisonment. 26
In international armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) is entitled to visit all places where protected persons are
interned or detained, and to interview them. Such visits may not be
prohibited "except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then
only as an exceptional and temporary measure. 227 Protected persons
entitled to such visits include all who "find themselves, in case of a conflict
or occupation, in the hands of a Party ...of which they are not
nationals., 228 Thus, if a State detains its own nationals on security grounds,
the detainees are not entitled to Red Cross visits. Nor are nationals of
neutral or co-belligerent States entitled to Red Cross visits, so long as their
countries maintain "normal diplomatic relations" with the detaining State.22 9

national security, and requiring government on remand to bear burden of proof), petition for
cert.filed, Sept. 19, 2008.
225 BP Americas, supra note 46, princ.. V; BP, supra note 37, art. 17 ("1. A detained
person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel. He shall be informed of his
right by the competent authority promptly after arrest and shall be provided with reasonable
facilities for exercising it. 2. If a detained person does not have a legal counsel of his own
choice, he shall be entitled to have a legal counsel assigned to him by a judicial or other
authority in all cases where the interests of justice so require and without payment by him if
he does not have sufficient means to pay.").
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has advised that the circumstances of a case
"--its significance, its legal character, and its context in a particular legal system-are
among the factors that bear on the determination of whether legal representation is or is not
necessary for a fair hearing." Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies,
Advisory Opinion OC- 11/990, 1990 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, T 28 (Aug. 10,
1990). Few circumstances could be more significant for a detainee than a hearing on
whether he may lawfully be detained indefinitely. Thus, the right to counsel is arguably an
essential element of a fair hearing. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (plurality opinion); id. at
540, 553 (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The ICRC asserts the procedural safeguard, "An internee/administrative detainee should
be allowed to have legal assistance." ICRC Guidelines, supranote 30, at 388.
226 BP, supra note 37, art. 29.1; accord BP Americas, supra note 46, princ. XXIV
(requiring regular institutional inspections).
227 Geneva IV, supra note 49, art. 143.
228 Id. art. 4.
229 Id.
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Although IHL provides no similar right in non-international armed
conflict, nonetheless230 the ICRC's "right of access in these situations is
widely recognized.,
VII. HUMANE TREATMENT OF SECURITY DETAINEES AND COMPENSATION
FOR UNLAWFUL DETENTION

The treatment of the detainee must be humane and must not subject
her to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.231
Humane treatment includes regular access to medical care. 2 Detainees
unlawfully detained have a right to be compensated.2 33
VIII. CONCLUSION

Because of the difficulties in relying exclusively on criminal
prosecution to confront the threat of terrorism, the United States, United
Kingdom and other States have grappled with developing systems of
preventive detention of suspected terrorists for security purposes. These
systems have not distinguished themselves as exemplars of the rule of law.
If prolonged or indefinite security detention is to be permitted, far greater
attention must be paid to the substantive and procedural safeguards of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
Except in the member states of the Council of Europe, where security
detention is allowed, if at all, only by derogation from the right to liberty,
IHRL allows security detention, provided it is not arbitrary or
discriminatory, is based on grounds and procedures previously established
by law that meet minimum procedural requirements, does not entail
inhuman treatment of detainees, and is no more restrictive of liberty or
long-lasting than required to meet the exigencies of security. In addition,
unlawfully detained persons have a right to be compensated. Security
23oICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 391.
231 CAT, supra note 29, arts. 2.1, 2.2, 16.1; ICCPR, supra note 28, arts. 7, 10.1; ECHR,
supra note, 39, art. 3; ACHR, supra note 41, art. 5; ADHR, supra note 43, arts. I, XXV;
ACHPR, supra note 47, art. 5; BP, supra note 37, arts. 1, 6; BP Americas, supra note 46,
princ. I; Geneva IV, supra note 49, Common Article 3.1 (a), (c), art. 27.
232BP, supra note 37, art. 24; BP Americas, supra note 46, princs. IX.3, X. The ICRC
asserts, "An internee/administrative detainee has the right to the medical care and attention
required by his or her condition." ICRC Guidelines, supra note 30, at 390 (citing Geneva
IV, supra note 49, art. 81 (medical attention as required by the detainees' state of health);
and Geneva Protocol II, supra note 54, art. 5.1(b) (internees must be afforded "safeguards"
as regards health "to the same extent as the local civilian population")).
233 ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 9.5; ECHR, supra note 39, art. 5.5; see also BP, supra
note 37, art. 35.1 ("Damage incurred because of acts or omissions by a public official
contrary to the rights contained in these principles shall be compensated according to the
applicable rules or liability provided by domestic law.").
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detention must also comply with other provisions of international law
where applicable, in particular IHL, which imposes similar requirements,
with the important addition that IHL generally prohibits detention of
foreign nationals in international armed conflict unless "absolutely
necessary" or "necessary, for imperative reasons of security."
IHRL would do well to follow the European model, which permits
security detention, if at all, only by derogation.234 That approach makes
clear that security detention is an extraordinary device to be used (if at all)
only in exceptional circumstances. The formalities of having to declare and
defend states of emergency 235 in order to derogate also ensure that
conscious, visible attention by government officials, lawmakers and judges
will focus on whether there is truly a need for security detention in a given
situation and, later, on whether the exigencies truly continue.
Under a derogation framework, this visible attention may be focused at
three distinct stages: when the legislature authorizes and designs a system
of preventive detention; when the executive formally invokes it in an
emergency; and when the independent judiciary considers, on a case-bycase basis, whether preventive detention of a particular suspected terrorist is
warranted.
Whether security detention is done under the European model,
allowing it only by derogation if at all, or is authorized without derogation
as currently allowed by IHRL outside Europe, two central questions merit
further consideration. First, what is the evidentiary basis required to justify
security detention? Given the fundamental liberty interests at stake in a
prolonged detention, the standard for preventive detention should be no less
than a preponderance of the evidence.
Second, should security detention outside the context of armed conflict
be allowed at all? Even taking into account that criminal justice systems
234

Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, at 540, 564, 568, 573, 577 (2004) (Scalia and

Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that indefinite wartime executive detention of citizens
accused of being enemy combatants is not permitted unless the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; in order to detain a citizen, the government must either pursue criminal
prosecution or suspend the writ). In contrast, the Court has held that foreign citizens who
fought against the U.S. in Afghanistan may be detained for the duration of that particular
conflict, but has not to date addressed whether the President has constitutional authority to
detain foreign citizens captured elsewhere as enemy combatants. Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229, 2240-41 (2008).
23 E.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 4.3:
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall
immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and
of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.

DOUGLASS CASSEL

[Vol. 98

encounter extreme difficulties in coping with terrorism, is preventive
detention always, or ever, necessary? Might not a system of alternative
restraints suffice, including house arrest, electronic ankle bracelets and the
other devices used in recent years in Britain? Acknowledging that some
suspects have managed to escape those restraints, can the devices be finetuned to be more efficient?
If security detention is to be allowed, it must be only with the greatest
caution and restraint. Granting executive or military officials authority, on
the basis of secret and often flawed intelligence information and subject
only to limited judicial review, to deprive persons of their liberty based on
grounds of security alone, is dangerous to liberty and to the rule of law. In
many countries political dissidents may be deemed security threats. Even
in democracies under the rule of law, zealous officials may be too quick to
conclude that someone is a security threat on the basis of shaky intelligence
information. If security detention is not prohibited altogether, its use must
be kept to an absolute minimum, and subjected to rigorous and redundant
procedural safeguards.
As a plurality of the United States Supreme Court recently warned:
[A]s critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually
pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing
international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of
detention carries the potential to become
236 a means for oppression and abuse of others
who do not present that sort of threat.

236

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530.

